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Abstract 
 
WHAT ARE WE TO MAKE OF SAFE BEHAVIOUR PROGRAMS? 
 
 
Safe behaviour programs are currently a popular strategy for improving safety in large 
organizations. This paper provides a critical look at the assumptions which underly 
such programs and identifies some of their limitations.  
 
Safe behaviour programs run the risk of assuming that unsafe behaviour is the only 
cause of accidents worth focusing on. The reality is that unsafe behaviour is merely 
the last link in a causal chain and not necessarily the most effective link to focus on, 
for the purposes of accident prevention.  
 
One major drawback of these programs is that they miss critically important unsafe 
behaviour, such as attempts by workers to re-start processes that have been 
temporarily interrupted. Conventional safe behaviour programs aimed at front line 
workers are also of no use in preventing accidents in which the behaviour of front line 
workers is not involved. 
 
Given that it is the behaviour of management which is most critical in creating a 
culture of safety in any organization, behavioural safety observations are likely to 
have their greatest impact if directed upwards, at managers.  
 
The paper concludes with an appendix about accident repeater programs which are 
sometimes introduced along with safe behaviour programs. 
 
Key words: Safe behaviour; hierarchy of controls; multi-causal accident analysis 
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What are we to make of Safe Behaviour Programs? 
 
 
Behaviour modification programs are now widely advocated as a means of reducing 
injuries at work. A variety of proprietary programs are on the market, for example, 
DuPont’s STOP, and Chevron Texaco’s POWERi, all aimed at encouraging 
employees to behave more safely. These programs are highly controversial, with 
unions arguing that they amount to a return to the strategy of blaming workers for the 
accidents which befall them, especially when they are associated with programs 
which punish workers who have accidentsii. On the other hand, companies are hoping 
such programs will prove the key to driving accident rates lower, and they criticise the 
union viewpoint as being merely obstructionistiii. What often seems to be in dispute is 
whether it is managers or employees who are responsible for safetyiv. Controversy is 
inevitable when the matter is framed in this way, and whole conferences have been 
devoted to behaviour-based safety, without any resolutionv.  
 
This paper seeks to move the debate forward in certain respects. It identifies the 
limitations of safe behaviour programs but goes on to highlight ways in which some 
of these limitations can be overcome.  
 
What are safe behaviour programs? 
 
A major review done for the UK Health and Safety Executive concluded that the most 
common of these “programmes requires front line staff to carry out behavioural safety 
observations on their colleagues” and feed the results back on a one-to-one basisvi. 
The feedback process requires sensitivity and observers need to be trained to do this 
effectively. An important variant of this approach does not require the observer to 
give one-to-one feedback. A small number of observers count instances of agreed 
unsafe behaviour, for example, cases of workers not wearing hearing protection. The 
data are collated and statistics are reported back to the group. If observations are done 
at regular intervals, trend data can prepared and the mere fact of measuring and 
reporting on the behaviour is often enough to generate improvementvii. 
 
The fallacy of mono-causality 
 
The popularity of this approach stems in part from the widely held view that “human 
factors” are the cause the great majority of accidentsviii. A conclusion which is 
frequently drawn from this observation is that the focus of accident prevention efforts 
needs to be shifted from engineering solutions to ensuring compliance with safe work 
practices. As the general manager of DuPont Australia once said, 
  
Both government safety organisations and unions are quite simplistic on safety. 
They focus on equipment, not on the acts of people. In our experience, 95 per 
cent of accidents occur because of the acts of people. They do something 
they’re not supposed to do and are trained not to do, but they do it anyway. 
Changing this behaviour is much harder than focussing on equipment. When 
you’ve done the technical things you’ve only just started. That’s just the tip of 
the iceberg of safety managementix. 
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This is the basis of the famous DuPont approach. Those responsible for developing 
the DuPont system assert strenuously that it is far more than a simple behaviour 
modification system, but its emphasis is undeniably on behaviour modification and 
that is how it is understood by many of its advocates as well as its criticsx.  
 
There is a basic fallacy in concluding that because the great majority of accidents are 
the result of human factors, in particular unsafe behaviour, the solution is to try to 
modify this behaviour. The fallacy is the presumption that accidents have a single or a 
primary cause. Modern accident analysis proceeds on the opposite assumption, that 
there is a potentially infinite network of causes which contribute to an accident, all of 
them causes in the sense that had they been different, the accident would probably not 
have occurredxi. What this means is that while unsafe behaviour may have triggered 
the accident, that behaviour is better viewed as something requiring explanation rather 
than in itself an explanation. The moment we begin to ask why the behaviour 
occurred we move back along various causal chains which invariably implicate 
management. Just as the great majority of accidents can be attributed to unsafe 
behaviour by front line workers, the great majority of accidents are at the same time 
attributable to actions or inactions by management. An example will make the point. 
 
A worker descending a steep set of stairs, falls and is injured. 
Why did he fall? 
He was not using the handrail, as he was required to do by company policy  
Why not? 
He was using both hands to carry tools? 
Why? 
If he used one hand to hold the rail he would have had to make more than one 
trip up and down the stairs to get his tools to the lower level. 
Why didn’t he do this?  
Because there was pressure from the supervisor to get the job done quickly. 
 
Production pressures routinely lie behind unsafe actions by workers in this way. 
Despite all the company rhetoric about putting safety first, the experience of many 
workers, not all, is that production takes precedence over safetyxii. But we can go 
further than this. The failure to use the handrail is not the only reason the worker fell.  
 
He fell because the stairs were too steep, far steeper than would be acceptable in 
the building code for houses, for example. 
Why were they so steep? 
Because the designers had not considered the hazards of steep stairways.  
Why had the designers not considered this hazard? 
Because they had not adopted the philosophy of designing out hazards at source. 
Why not? 
Because the regulator was not enforcing the relevant regulations.  
 
This example could easily be developed further, but this is far enough to demonstrate 
the truly multi-causal nature of every accident. 
 
Once it is recognized that a network of causes lies behind any particular event, it is 
immediately clear that there may be several points at which it is possible to intervene 
in the causal network to prevent accidents. Modifying the behaviour of the front line 
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worker is certainly not the only accident prevention strategy and it may not be the 
most effective. In the example above, the behaviour modification approach focusses 
on getting workers to use the handrail. Another strategy, arguably more effective, 
would be to use a safer stairway design.  
 
The fallacy of mono-causality is manifested in an interesting way in an otherwise very 
sophisticated document on behavioural change produced for the UK oil and gas 
industryxiii. The document asserts that there are stages which an industry goes through 
in seeking to improve safety. First, it concentrates on engineering improvements. 
When this stage has almost exhausted itself and accident rates are no longer coming 
down, there is a shift to safety management systems as the way to drive further 
improvement. Finally, when these have exhausted their potential, the focus must shift 
to behaviour modification. (See figure 1 )  
 
 
Figure 1: Stepchange’s three ages of safety  
 
It has to be said that this three stage analysis is highly contestable; indeed the analysis 
of Hale and others flatly contradicts it. They assert that a first age of technical, 
engineering improvements was succeeded by a second age, in the 1960s and 1970s in 
which human factors were seen as the central issues to be addressed. The late 1980s 
saw the dawn of a third age in which the structure and functioning of management 
was seen to be crucial.xiv  
 
We do not need to resolve this contradiction here. The point to note is the conclusion 
which is drawn in the UK document, namely that further progress in improving health 
and safety depends on behaviour modification. The assumption is that the engineering 
and management level causes underlying accidents have already been addressed. The 
fact is, however, that even today in the oil and gas industry, as soon as we ask why a 
certain unsafe behaviour occurred, we inevitably find engineering and management 
factors which have contributed to the behaviour, in the sense that had they been 
different the unsafe behaviour would not have occurred. In short, we find ways of 
eliminating or reducing risky behaviour that are not dependent on behaviour 
modification techniques.  
 
It is noteworthy that “human factors” specialists generally do not commit the fallacy 
identified above. It has long been recognised in the airline industry, for instance, that 
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errors and violations are involved in the great majority of aircraft accidents, but the 
response of the industry has not been to promote safe behaviour programs; rather it 
has been to identity the factors which have contributed to these errors and violations 
such as cockpit layout, inadequate crew resource management1 and so on, and to work 
at changing these. This raises an intriguing question: why is it that that response to 
violations by front line workers in the airline industry (pilots) has been to look for the 
causes of their behaviour while in so many other industries the response is to adopt 
behavioural safety programs? I shall not attempt to answer this question here, but it is 
clearly an intriguing one.  
 
It is appropriate to let Flemming and Lardner have the last say on this point: 
 
Whilst a focus on changing unsafe behaviour into safe behaviour is appropriate, 
this should not deflect attention from analysing why people behave unsafely. To 
focus solely on changing individual behaviour without considering necessary 
changes to how people are organised, managed, motivated, rewarded and their 
physical work environment, tools and equipment can result in treating the 
symptoms only, without addressing the root causes of unsafe behaviourxv. 
 
The fallacy of mono-causality does not by itself account for union antagonism to 
behavioural safety programs. There is something else going on which needs to be 
highlighted. Regardless of the intention of behavioural safety advocates, their 
approach is inevitably associated with a tendency to blame the victims. To understand 
why, let us first distinguish between explanation and blame. Explanation is a rational 
process and explanations can be subjected to empirical evaluation - does the evidence 
support them? Blame, on the other hand, is a fundamentally emotional response, 
beyond the realm of reason. Despite this distinction, or perhaps because of it, in the 
case of harmful events there is an almost universal tendency to allocate blame at the 
point where explanation comes to an end. Given that safe behaviour programs explain 
accidents in terms of unsafe behaviour, it is almost impossible to avoid attributing 
some degree of blame to the victim (assuming, of course, it is the victim’s behaviour 
that is unsafe). In contrast, if we ask why an employee violated a procedure and seek 
an explanation further up the causal chain, there is much less tendency to blame the 
worker concerned. If blame is still to be attributed it will be to the organization as a 
whole, or to those responsible for the way the organization is operating. It is obvious 
that if behavioural safety programs are to have any chance of success, they must 
strenuously oppose this tendency to blame employees for their unsafe behaviour.  
 
The hierarchy of controls 
 
The idea that there is a network of causes contributing to every accident is the starting 
point for understanding in more detail some of the shortcomings of behavioural safety 
programs.  
 
There is a well-known hierarchy of controls for preventing accidents. At the top of the 
hierarchy, the most effective control is to eliminate entirely the hazard in question, for 
                                                 
1 It is true that poor CRM is a behavioural issue, concerning the decision making behaviour of captains. 
But poor CRM is  not simply a matter of non-compliance with procedures. Better CRM requires better 
decision making procedures and it requires that crews be trained in these procedures. This is not the 
kind of behaviour modification envisaged in safe behaviour programs. 
 7
example replacing toxic substances with non-toxics. Further down the hierarchy are 
engineering controls such as exhaust fans for toxic vapours. Further down again are 
administrative controls, such as limiting exposure periods to toxic substances. At the 
bottom of the hierarchy is personal protective equipment, such as gloves and masks. 
 
All these methods offer potential ways in which accidents may be avoided, but 
controls at the top of the hierarchy are more certain and more effective than those at 
the bottom. PPE is notoriously ineffective and should only be relied upon as a last 
resort. Moreover, controls which depend upon front line workers doing the right thing 
can never be totally reliable. Al Chapanis explains why: 
 
“Everyone, and that includes you and me, is at times careless, complacent, 
overconfident and stubborn. At times each of us becomes distracted, inattentive, 
bored and fatigued. We occasionally take chances, we misunderstand, we 
misinterpret and we misread. These are completely human characteristics. 
Because we are human and because all these traits are fundamental and built 
into each of us, the equipment, machines and systems that we construct for our 
use have to be made to accommodate us the way we are, and not vice versa”xvi  
 
Unfortunately, in too many contexts PPE and behavioural rules are the only controls 
seriously considered. Moreover, they are adopted as an afterthought, after the machine 
or a process has been designedxvii. Failure to implement the hierarchy of controls can 
often be thought of as one of the causes of an accident. For instance, in the stairway 
example above, failure to design out the hazard was certainly a cause of the accident.  
 
Behaviour-based safety is generally concerned with the lower end of the hierarchy of 
controls. Observations will be made, for example, on whether people are wearing 
hearing protection as required, or whether they are using the handrail on a stairway. 
Clearly, behaviour based safety directs attention to the least effective accident 
prevention strategies.  
 
There is no reason in principle why an organisation which is has adopted a safe 
behaviour program should not at the same time be energetically implementing higher 
level controls. The best of them arexviii. In practice, however, a focus on behavioural 
safety can lead to the abandonment of any commitment to the hierarchy of controls.xix 
Unions argue that where safe behaviour programs are introduced, worker health and 
safety representatives are often co-opted and lose sight of the ways in which 
employers can eliminate or mitigate hazards.  
 
Safe behaviour programs are sometimes quite explicit about this very narrow focus. 
Consider this passage in a behavioural safety manual: 
 
“When an intervention has been running successfully for some time, the number 
of behavioural issues left to be addressed will decrease. At this stage, there may 
be a temptation for observers to shift their focus onto issue such as physical 
workplace conditions that are normally dealt with by supervisors and/or safety 
representatives. It’s very important, however, that the two are kept separate. The 
observer’s job is simply to take an accurate measurement of a behaviour (and to 
seek to understand why it occurred). If observers get into situations where 
they’re chasing up actions, they will be seen (and will feel) more like 
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‘policemen’. Their role will become less positive, less proactive and 
considerably more stressful. Moreover, both employees being observed and their 
managers may resent what they see as unwarranted interference”.xx
 
While the logic of this statement is understandable, the practical consequences are 
disturbing. As the statement recognizes, workers who are on the lookout for unsafe 
acts will naturally become more aware of unsafe conditions in the workplace - 
hazards. These are unequivocally the responsibility of management. A manager who 
treats a hazard report as “unwarranted interference” shows a blatant disregard for 
safety. If workers are in any way discouraged from reporting unsafe conditions, they 
will naturally infer that management is wishing to focus exclusively on unsafe 
behaviour as the cause of accidents and to blame workers for accidents which befall 
them.  
 
Reporting hazards is a particularly important way of preventing accidents. Research 
shows that major accidents are always preceded by warning signs, indicators that the 
hazards concerned are not properly under controlxxi. Had these indicators been 
responded to, the accident would have been averted. Any employer who seeks to 
introduce a behavioural safety system, and wishes to convince its workforce that it is 
serious about safety, needs at the same time to introduce or energise a system for 
reporting hazards and warning signs. Of course reporting hazards is not enough - 
these reports must be acted on - and this is where employer sincerity about safety will 
really be demonstrated as far as the workforce is concerned. 
 
It is interesting to note that there are other safety programs aimed at front line workers 
which are not restricted in the way that behavioural safety programs are. These 
alternative programs are essentially mini risk assessment procedures that workers 
carry out at the beginning of a job, and they invite workers to consider all potential 
risk factors, not just their own behaviour or that of their workmates. One such 
programs is Xstrata Coal’s S.L.A.M, which stands for Stop, Look, Assess, Manage. 
The program advises workers to  
 
STOP   Engage your mind before your hands 
LOOK  At the workplace and find the hazards 
ASSESS  The effects of the hazards on people, property and the environment.  
MANAGE  With effective controls and advise others 
 
The SLAM program explicitly asks workers to report hazards to supervisors. In this 
respect it differs strikingly from strict behaviourial safety programs. Mini risk 
assessments of this nature are thus immune from many of the criticisms made of 
behaviour modification programs.  
 
This is not to say that the mini risk assessment strategy is necessarily successful. If it 
is not carefully managed it can rapidly degenerate into an ineffective ritual. This is 
particularly likely when workers are asked to fill out cards routinely and hand them to 
supervisors to be filed without further comment. It is only when supervisors and 
managers are keen to make such systems work that they reach their potentialxxii.  
 
Given that behavioural safety programs are in principle not concerned with unsafe 
conditions, it is vital that any organization which seeks to introduce such a program 
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should at the same time introduce or revitalize a program of hazard observation and 
reporting. 
 
What Behavioural Safety Misses 
 
To return to our topic, it is important to note that behavioural safety programs 
encourage a focus on behaviour with certain characteristics. First, it must be readily 
observable behaviour. As one proponent puts it: “The golden rule for these behaviors 
is that they are directly observable: i.e. anybody can see them as they occur”.xxiii As 
another says, the behaviour must be “observable to the naked eye”.xxiv Second, the 
behaviour must occur frequently, so that it can be counted repeatedly and any changes 
in frequency noted. These twin characteristics naturally highlight certain kinds of 
behaviour by front line employees, such as the wearing of PPE and the use of 
handrails when going up or down stairs.  
 
It needs to be stressed that many types of unsafe behaviour are systematically missed 
by this approach, either because they are infrequent, or because they are not obvious 
to the casual observer. One of the common causes of accidents is the short cuts which 
workers take in the attempt to get a process going again which has temporarily 
jammed or broken down in some wayxxv. Workers may put their hands into a 
dangerous machine, or crawl into a dangerous place, contrary to explicit safety rules, 
because they know this is the most effective, perhaps the only way to get the process 
started again. They do so because of production pressures they are under. Such 
pressures are particularly intense when pay systems are tied to production, so that lost 
time is lost pay, or where there are quotas, with penalties for not achieving the 
quotaxxvi. Workers who in normal circumstances may be scrupulous about complying 
with rules such as the wearing of PPE will sometimes throw caution to the wind at 
times of crisis in order to get production going again. Unsafe behaviour of this nature 
does not fulfill a crucial characteristic mentioned above. It is relatively rare, precisely 
because breakdowns are abnormal, and casual observers are therefore not likely to be 
carrying out observations when it occurs. Even if they did become aware of it, it 
would be difficult if not impossible to quantify meaningfully. 
 
A second crucial limitation is that unsafe behaviour may not be readily observable to 
the naked eye. Numerous accidents occur because of failures to properly implement 
permit to work systems, or isolate plant that is supposed to be isolated, or respond 
appropriately to alarms. The casual behavioural observer is not in a position to 
identify unsafe behaviour of this type. Indeed there may be whole sequences of 
behaviour which need to be observed or even studied before it can be said that the 
behaviour in question is unsafe.  
 
More generally, it may require considerable expertise to recognize the behaviour as 
unsafe. An excellent example of this is the Longford gas plant explosion near 
Melbourne in 1998xxvii. The explosion was triggered by actions of front line workers 
trying to restart a pump. Neither they, nor their supervisors, nor even the plant 
manager realized that this behaviour was unsafe, and no behavioural observer would 
ever have picked it up. 
 
It is clear that the focus on behaviour which occurs frequently and which anyone can 
readily observe inevitably restricts attention to a very limited, even trivial class of 
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behaviours. As one review puts it: “(Safe behaviour) schemes tend to focus on slips 
and trips types of risk that are observable and readily repeatable”xxviii  
 
Finally, standard behavioural safety programs can have no impact on accidents that 
occur without any active behaviour, safe or unsafe, on the part of front line workers. 
This is such a significant class of events that it is explicitly recognized by theorists of 
accident causation. In Jim Reason’s model, for instance, unsafe acts are seen as 
having a variety of organisational causes, but these organisational causes, or latent 
conditions as he calls them, can also cause accidents directly, without the need for 
unsafe behaviour at the front line (see the latent condition pathways in figure 2). 
Some of the best know accidents are of this nature, having nothing to do any 
immediate unsafe behaviour. Both the space shuttle disasters, Challenger, in 1986, 
and Columbia, in 2003, occurred without any input from shuttle crews, but instead 
resulted from shuttle design flaws and decisions made by senior NASA managers. 
Again, the Moura mine disaster in Queensland in which 11 men died in 1994 was not 
the result of the activity of the men who were underground on the night of the 
explosion. The levels of explosive gas in the mine were rising and the mine was a 
virtual time bomb set to go off at a certain time, regardless of who was underground 
or what they were doing. Management should never have sent men underground that 
night. xxix  
 
Figure 2: Reason’s accident causation model (Source, Reason, 1997, p17) 
 
Management behaviour 
 
The preceding discussion has implicitly raised one of the most serious limitations of 
conventional safe behaviour programs. Management behaviour is always a factor 
contributing to accidents. Corporate funding decisions, what it is that managers attend 
to, the example they set - these are crucial determinants of organisational outcomes of 
all sorts, including accidents, but safe behaviour programs, with there focus on 
frequent and readily observable behaviour, have difficulty taking account of such 
behaviour.  
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Many commentators suggest that unless safe behaviour programs can include the 
behaviour of managers they will be relatively ineffective, in part because they will be 
missing crucial contributory factors, but also because they will be resisted by front 
line workers because of what they will see as an unfair focus on their own behaviour.  
 
Fleming and Lardner have devoted considerable attention to the incorporation of 
management behaviour into safe behaviour programs. They identify two critical 
management behaviours conducive to safety.  
 
• Meeting with employees frequently to discuss safety issues 
• Responding quickly to safety suggestions and concerns raised by 
employeesxxx.  
 
They go on to suggest a list of behaviour measures which safe behaviour programs 
can use to promote these behavioursxxxi.  
 
• The number of interactions per week with frontline staff where safety is the 
main topic of conversation and the member of staff rates the interaction as 
positive. (Employees to complete card evaluating quality of interaction and 
submit anonymously.) 
• The number of safety concerns raised by employees per week that are 
responded to, actions agreed and a completion date mutually agreed within 12 
working hours. 
• The percentage of actions complete within the mutually agreed completion 
date per week. 
• The number of safety suggestions raised by employees per week that are 
responded to, next steps identified and a completion date mutually agreed with 
12 working hours. 
• The percentage of safety suggestions progressed each week within the 
mutually agree timescale. 
 
Notice that these measures involve judgments and discussions of various kinds; they 
are not observations that can be made “with the naked eye”. In this respect they 
involve a departure from the purest form of observation envisaged by the proponents 
of safe behaviour programs. Clearly such departures are necessary in order to produce 
useful measures of management behaviour.  
 
It should be noted, too, that these measures do not get at some of the management 
behaviour which contributes most significantly and directly to accidents. Consider the 
management decision in the Challenger case to go ahead with a launch which the 
engineers opposed; the decision in the Colombia case to ignore the damage which 
Columbia sustained on take off; and the decision by Moura managers not to withdraw 
men from the mine even though it was known to be approaching a dangerous state. 
This decision making behaviour by management contributed directly to the outcomes, 
yet it is not captured by the Fleming and Lardner proposals. Even their extension of 
behavioural safety ideas into the arena of management fails to capture some of the 
most crucial management behaviour. 
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Some big companies are taking very seriously this idea that safe behaviour programs 
must somehow encompass management behaviour. To this end they ask workers to 
make observations and appraisals of the behaviour of their managers.  
 
“In Shell Expro in the UK all managers were subject to an upward appraisal by 
their staff on their commitment to safety and their safety leadership style. This 
led to a personal report to each senior manager and a summary of the data 
presented to the whole group. Senior managers, where appropriate, agreed 
actions for changing their own behaviours. By repeating this process over time 
their behaviour was influenced in a positive direction”xxxii.  
 
A BP senior executive recounts the story of a behavioural safety program that 
encouraged a drilling crew to make observations about the unsafe behaviour of a 
supervisor that eventually led to the redeployment of the supervisorxxxiii.  
 
One can see in all these strategies an attempt to direct the focus of attention upward, 
at the behaviour of managers. After all, they are the employees whose behaviour is 
most critical to safety. As the BP manager quoted above also said: “When a leader 
visits the workplace, they see the behaviours of their own people but they also see, 
reflected in their people, their own behaviours. That sums it up for me.” 
 
These attempts to direct the focus upwards necessarily depart from the strict rules laid 
down by the safe behaviour theorists requiring that the behaviour to be measured be 
directly observable and frequently occurring. Such rules clearly limit the effectiveness 
of the method.  
 
Do safe behaviour programs work? 
 
Despite all the objections which I have raised, a crucial question has been left 
hanging. Do safe behaviour programs, focused on frequently occurring and readily 
observable behaviour, actually work to reduce accidents? Does it help to run a 
campaign to get people to use the handrail?  
 
If we go back for a moment to the idea of a multi-causal network it is clear that these 
programs have the potential to work. Encouraging people to hold on to the hand rail 
has the potential to reduce the number of accidents, even if nothing is done about stair 
case design.  
 
The evidence is that sometimes these programs work and sometimes they don’txxxiv. 
There are indeed cases where the introduction of safe behaviour programs have led to 
a reduction in accident rates. The crucial feature which distinguishes those that work 
from those that don’t is whether or not there is trust between workers and 
managementxxxv. This depends in turn on whether leaders are perceived to be 
committed to safety, whether managers consult actively and respectfully with workers 
and whether there is a mature safety management system which is functioning well in 
practice. Without these features, in particular, trust, research indicates that safe 
behaviour systems will be ineffective.  
 
There is a lesson here for companies which bewail union attitudes to behavioural 
safety programs. Union opposition stems from distrust of the employer and a belief 
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this is just an attempt to shift responsibility for accidents from the employer to the 
employees. Where such distrust exists it is pointless for employers to seek to 
introduce such programs. The evidence is that they will fail. In such circumstances 
employers need first to concentrate on mending relationships with employees. As 
Peterson puts it, “In some organizations there is a deep mistrust between managers 
and workers. In these organizations much needs to happen before the behaviour-based 
concepts can be successful”.xxxvi
 
Conclusion 
 
Safe behaviour programs run the risk of assuming that unsafe behaviour is the only 
cause of accidents worth focusing on. This is the fallacy of mono-causality. The 
reality is that unsafe behaviour is merely the last link in a causal chain and not 
necessarily the most effective link to focus on, for the purposes of accident 
prevention. Safe behaviour programs are certainly a reasonable component of any 
comprehensive safety management system, but they should never be the central 
component and care should be taken that they do not shift the emphasis away from 
potentially more important safety management strategies such as designing out risks 
at source. Put another way, unsafe acts are only one part of the story - unsafe 
conditions are the other - and any good safety management system must include 
vigorous programs aimed at identifying and rectifying unsafe conditions. 
 
Given that it is the behaviour of management which is most critical in creating a 
culture of safety in any organization, behavioural safety observations are likely to 
have their greatest impact if directed upwards, at managers. Considerable thought 
needs to be given to how this can best be achieved and the best companies are leading 
the way in this respect.  
 
One major drawback of behavioural safety programs is that they miss critically 
important unsafe behaviour, such as attempts by workers to re-start processes that 
have been temporarily interrupted. Conventional safe behaviour programs aimed at 
front line workers are also of no use in preventing accidents in which the behaviour of 
front line workers is not involved. 
 
Finally, the evidence is that safe behaviour programs do not work when the workforce 
mistrusts its management and believes that this is just another way to hold workers 
responsible. Where such beliefs prevail, employers must first win the trust of their 
workforce, by tackling some of the issues they see as affecting safety, such as 
production pressures or perhaps fatigue. Perhaps the best way to introduce safe 
behaviour programs is to start with upward appraisals of management behaviour. 
Only when progress is made in these areas are safe behaviour programs aimed at front 
line workers likely to achieve whatever potential they may have.  
 
 
Appendix: Accident Repeater Programs 
 
Safe behaviour programs are particularly mistrusted by unions when they are 
associated with another accident reduction strategy, namely, identifying and singling 
out accident repeaters for special treatment. What makes these programs problematic 
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is that the special treatment may culminate in punishment. Nancy Lesson provides the 
following description:  
 
An injury discipline program popular in the United States is the “Accident 
Repeaters Program”, which identifies workers who have had a certain number of 
injuries (usually one or two in a 12 or 24 month period) and places them in a 
program whereby they will get counseling if they report another injury; receive 
a written warning for their next injury; a suspension for the next injury; and 
termination should they report another injury after that. xxxvii
 
Let us consider this situation in more detail. Suppose we have a group of a thousand 
workers, of which about one in five suffer a minor injury, requiring some kind of first 
aid treatment, over the course a year. Suppose a closer study reveals that the pattern is 
actually as follows. 
 
 Number of injuries per worker:   0 1 2 3 
 Number of workers experiencing  
the given number of injuries  819 164 16 1 
 
 
Accident repeater programs of the type mentioned above would have little hesitation 
in identifying the 16 people who had suffered two injuries as accident prone and the 
one who suffered three would almost certainly be the subject of disciplinary action. 
 
This would be a serious error of logic, not to mention an injustice. Suppose accidents 
are simply a matter of bad luck and are randomly distributed amongst a population of 
workers in any particular time period, we would expect a small proportion of those 
who are injured will in fact have the bad luck to be injured twice. Among these people 
there may be a sub group which is injured three times or more, purely by chance. 
Putting this another way, some workers will experience more injuries than others, by 
chance alone. The distribution displayed above is precisely the distribution we would 
expect if chance alone was all that was operating. It is the well-known Poisson 
distribution.  
 
If chance is all that is operating and the individual who was injured three times in one 
year was just plain unlucky, s/he almost certainly will not be injured three times or 
even two times in the next 12 months. The probability of that occurring is very slight, 
assuming that chance is all that is operating. If s/he were indeed to suffer two or three 
injuries in the second 12 month period we would be entitled to conclude that 
something other than chance was operating and that this individual was indeed 
accident prone for some reason. Under these circumstances it would be appropriate to 
single this person out for special consideration. (Note that a person who continually 
suffers more accidents than others does not necessarily have an accident prone 
personality. It may be that their job is particularly risky, or that there is something 
else about the person’s circumstances that is increasing the risk of accident.)   
 
The point about all this is that before an accident repeater program is implemented, it 
needs to be demonstrated that the repeaters are not simply the chance repeaters 
predicted by the Poisson distribution. Unless we are sure that the distribution of 
accidents in a particular population of workers is significantly different from the 
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Poisson distribution we are likely to end up scapegoating individuals who have 
experienced a disproportionate number of accidents through no fault of their own. 
 
It is clear from the description of the accident repeater programs given earlier that 
those responsible for such programs have not considered the possibility that repeaters 
are simply the victims of chance; they jump immediately to the conclusion that such 
people are accident prone. 
 
It is instructive to compare this response to the response of companies and their 
insurers when dealing with cancers and other illnesses which may possibly have been 
caused by exposure to a particular hazardous substance in a particular workplace. 
There will always be a certain number of cancer cases occurring in the population of 
workers, by chance alone, that is, for reasons which have nothing to do with exposure 
in the workplace. Companies and their insurers often will not accept that a particular 
case of cancer is work-related unless it can he shown that the number of workers from 
the workplace in question who have been diagnosed with cancer is higher than would 
occur by chance, that is, higher than in a population of comparable workers not 
exposed to the substances in question. In short, in this context there is a very strong 
tendency to assume that the phenomenon of concern is to due to chance, unless and 
until it is proved otherwise. 
 
We see, then, that in the context of compensible illnesses, chance is assumed to be 
operating until the evidence can be assembled to rule out this hypothesis. In the 
context of accident repeater programs, the hypothesis that chance is all that is 
operating is not even considered. There is clearly a logical inconsistency here. These 
logically inconsistent responses are, however, consistent in one sense. In both cases 
workers lose out. Why this might be so will not be pursued here. 
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